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BRADY V M4RYLAND, ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE,
AND MATERIALITY: FAILED INVESTIGATIONS,
LONG-CHAIN EVIDENCE, AND BEYOND
David Crump*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Brady v. Maryland,' the Supreme Court set the basic outlines of
what has become known as the "Brady doctrine." 2 The government,
according to this principle, has a general duty to disclose information in
its possession that is favorable to the defense.3 The concept, at least in its
rough outlines, is largely noncontroversial. In other words, almost
everyone would agree that the government has such a duty.4 The
application of the Brady doctrine, however, is both controversial and
dependent on perceptions and prejudices of the individual interpreter.
A requirement of what the Court has called "materiality" is at
the heart of the doctrine. 6 But the significance of this requirement
is different from the meaning of materiality in other contexts.
Loosely, materiality as an element of a Brady violation is intended to

* A.B., Harvard College; J.D., University of Texas School of Law; John B. Neibel
Professor of Law, University of Houston.
1. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. See id. at 87.
3. Id.
4. There is a substantial body of literature mentioning the duty created by Brady favorably.
E.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 708-09
(2006); Bruce A. Green, FederalCriminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 MERCER
L. REV. 639, 644 (2012); Enrico B. Valdez, PracticalEthics for the ProfessionalProsecutor, 1 ST.
MARY'S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 250, 257-59 (2011).

5. See infra Part II.B; see also Paul C. Giannelli, Brady andJailhouse Snitches, 57 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 593, 599-600 (2007) (discussing the ambiguity of the Brady doctrine).
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. For example, "materiality" for purposes of rules of evidence refers to the relationship
between an item of evidence and a contested issue, without regard to its importance, which
corresponds instead to its probative value. See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 65 (2013).
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correspond to a kind of importance.' The idea is that information
not at all likely to affect the outcome at trial is not the kind of
information with which Brady is concerned.' Just as the Brady doctrine
is intuitively appealing, so is the materiality requirement because
information that is unimportant does not seem an appropriate subject of
a constitutional mandate.
On the other hand, some statutes or rules omit materiality as a
requirement.o For example, Rule 3.8(e) of the D.C. Rules of
ProfessionalConduct," which is similar to rules adopted in many other
jurisdictions,12 does not include the materiality element as a limit on the
government's duty." The literal meaning of the Rule and others like it is
that the government attorney is required to disclose information that is
favorable to the defense, irrespective of its importance. 14 The Rule may
(or may not) reflect an intention to go beyond the Brady doctrine and to
place a higher and more onerous duty on the government.I Literally, the
Rule can be read to mean that favorable information of the slightest
importance, even if of infinitesimally small relevance, must be disclosed
to the defense.16 In turn, this reading means that an attorney can be
disbarred for having missed an issue that was immaterial-and therefore
difficult to recognize.17
Part II of this Article develops the meaning of the Brady doctrine,
including varying statements of its contours.18 Part III explores the
meaning of Rule 3.8(e) and rules like it.19 Part IV provides some
examples of the borderland of the Brady doctrine.20 Then, it deals with
what can be described as failed investigations, diffusion, and long-chain
circumstantial evidence, all of which are conceptually distinct flora and
fauna in the borderland of the Brady biota.21

8.

See infra Part I.A.

9. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-71 (2009).
10.

11.
12.
13.
2015).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part I.

D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(e) (D.C. BAR 2007).
See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(e); see In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 212-13 (D.C.
In re Kline, 113 A.3d at 213.
Id. at 212-13.
Id.
See id. at 215-16.
See infra Part I.

19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part IV.A-C.
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Part V explains why there must be some requirement that the
information be important: the requirement that is supplied in the Brady
doctrine by the materiality concept and that is omitted from the text of
Rule 3.8(e).22 If it is not explicit, in other words, some notion of
materiality will necessarily be inferred from the general concept that it is
"favorable" information that must be supplied to the defense.23 The final
Part sets out the author's conclusions, which include the idea that if
interpreted to remove the materiality concept, Rule 3.8(e) may
unfortunately make the government's duty more ambiguous, more
unfair, and perhaps more unachievable, than it otherwise might be.2 4
II.

A.

THE BRADY DOCTRINE

Expressing the Brady Principle

Smith v. Cain25 is a recent statement of the Brady doctrine in an
opinion that eight members of the Supreme Court joined, and it therefore
can be taken as a representative sample of the varying statements of the
concept.26 The case was a horrifying one, involving a home invasion
robbery that included five murders by strangers. 27 A detective's notes
contained the assertion that the sole eyewitness "could not . .. supply a
description of the perpetrators other then [sic] they were black males."28
The eyewitness identified the defendant at trial. 29 The notes were not
provided to the defense, and consequently, the defense did not use the
30
detective's statement as a means of impeaching the identification.
Later, the notes surfaced, and the defendant predicated a claim of a
Brady violation on the nondisclosure.'
The Supreme Court expressed the Brady doctrine in simple terms:
"[T]he State violates a defendant's right to due process if it withholds
evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant's

22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012).
26. Id. at 629-30.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 629 (alteration in original). There was also a typed report with a sentence of similar
effect and importance. Id. at 630.
29. Id. at 629.
30. Id. at 630.
31. Id. The notes came to light as a result of discovery in post-conviction proceedings. Id. at
629.
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guilt or punishment."32 Evidence is material within the meaning of this
principle "when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been
different."3 3 But materiality is a far lower standard than a first reading of
this definition might imply, because a reasonable probability "does not
mean that the defendant 'would more likely than not have received a
different verdict with the evidence."' 3 4 It requires "only that the
likelihood of a different result is great enough to 'undermine[]
confidence in the outcome of the trial."' 3 5
The application of this standard will always differ from case to case
because it depends on the rest of the evidence.36 Suspected Brady
material may not be material "if the State's other evidence is strong
enough to sustain confidence in the verdict."" Thus, ironically, although
the government's duty is to disclose the information when it can be
useful, a Brady violation may be identifiable only after conviction,
if there is sufficient evidence of guilt. 38 In Smith v. Cain, there
was substantial other evidence that could have been taken to corroborate
the witness's identification.39 For example, the witness's other
contemporaneous statements confirmed that his uncertainty about
identification referred to the other participants in the crime, not to the
one he identified.40 His statements immediately after the incident also
explained the reason: he was able to look closely and for more time at
this defendant.4 1 Furthermore, he did not identify any image later in a
large photographic spread that did not include this defendant, and he
quickly identified this defendant in another photographic spread.42
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the other evidence could not
sustain the result sufficiently to meet the standard.4 3 The Court noted
that there was only one eyewitness who testified and that the undisclosed
statement, if taken alone, impeached that witness directly."

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 630.
Id (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 (2009)).
Id. (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434).
See id.
Id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13, 112 n.21 (1976)).
See id.
Id. at 630, 632, 634.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 634 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id at 632.
Id. at 630-31 (majority opinion).
Id. at 630.
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Justice Thomas dissented. 4 5 He reasoned that the materiality
requirement meant that this defense must show a "reasonable
probability" of a different result made "in the context of the entire
record."46 This statement of the standard could have fit within the
majority opinion without disturbing it. Justice Thomas's application of
the standard, however, seems to have envisioned a higher level of
probability than the majority's application of the standard.47 It also
implied a narrower application of the doctrine, because Justice Thomas
parsed the record to conclude that the witness must have intended his
expression of uncertainty to attach to the other participant in the crime,
not to the present defendant.4 8 In fact, Justice Thomas's opinion suggests
that a reasonable observer would not have considered the alleged Brady
information at issue as undermining the result at all.49
B.

Variances, Ambiguities, and Uncertaintiesin the Brady Concept

"Brady has gray areas and some Brady decisions are difficult,""
said the Supreme Court in Connick v. Thompson,"' which was a civil
case for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged Brady
violation.52 But the decision reflected a deep disagreement within the
Court." The majority consisted of five justices who reversed a jury
verdict awarding damages.54 But the dissent by four members of the
Court concluded that the members of the district attorney's office that
prosecuted the case had "[firom the top down ... misperceived Brady's
compass."" This sharp difference is emblematic of the vagaries of
application that are found in different decision-makers' views of the line
that Brady draws.56

45. Id. at 631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. Id. (first quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); and then quoting
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)).
47. Id. at 633-35.
48. Id.at631-41.
49.

See id at 640-41. Justice Thomas's opinion details reasons to conclude that the witness

could not reasonably be understood as saying that he could not identify the defendant, as opposed to
the other participants. See id. at 632-40.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 56-57.
See id. at 68-70.
Id. at 53-54, 72.
Id. at 79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id at 68-70 (majority opinion).
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Even seemingly small differences in the statement of the Brady
principle can create big differences in meaning. In Strickler v. Greene,7
for example, the Court wrote that materiality requires a violation "so
serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence
would have produced a different verdict."5 The insertion of the phrase,
"so serious" may not change the logic of the sentence, 59 but it implies
that the violation must be relatively big and obvious.60 In addition, the
basis of the violation must be "evidence" in this formulation, with the
implication that it must appear in an admissible form, not as a mere lead;
in other cases, in contrast, the basis of a violation has been
"information," with the implication that it need not be evidence.61 True
to these suggestions, the Court in Strickler held that other evidence in
the record provided sufficient support for the verdict, and therefore that
the violation was not material.62
The differences between the opinion of the majority in Smith v.
Cain and the dissent of Justice Thomas in that case illustrate other
variances in interpretation. Justice Thomas's close inspection of the
evidence contrasts sharply with the more intuitive conclusion of the
majority.63 One might speculate that these different points of view could
reflect the contrasting views of a justice, on the one hand, who defines
materiality by considering how a holistically reasoning jury might
value a discrepancy, and another justice who reasons on a case-by-case
basis, as an appellate court traditionally evaluates the sufficiency of
the evidence.64

Then, too, one might ask just how weighty the questioned
information must be to be considered material?65 Must it create a twenty
percent probability of a different outcome? A forty percent probability?
Or, in the other direction, a mere five percent, or even a reasonable
doubt about the verdict? Alternatively, since the Supreme Court seems
unlikely to put the definition of materiality in terms of a numerical

57. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
58. Id. at 281.
59. The idea of materiality as undermining confidence in the verdict reflects a degree of
seriousness, and thus the "so serious" remark can be seen as unnecessary rhetoric.
60. Even if the phrase can be read as surplusage, see supra note 59, it is an intensifier that
seems to elevate the standard.
61. See, e.g., Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
62. 527 U.S. at 294-96.
63. Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630-41 (2012).
64. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
65.

See Gershman, supranote 4, at 706-07.
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percentage, must the probability be "significant" or "slight?"6 6 The
Supreme Court has not told us, except to say that it must "undermine
confidence in the verdict."6 Perhaps this is all that can be expected of an
interpretation of a constitutional doctrine, but it produces the likelihood
of wide swings in results from decision-makers with different points
of view. 68
The background of the decision-maker becomes more important
with such an amorphous standard.69 For example, there is a wide
difference between the perceptions of assistant district attorney about the
meaning of the Brady doctrine and the counterpart perceptions of
defense lawyers.70 The latter group tends to view the Brady principle as
much more far-reaching than the former, so that it includes even
distantly related circumstantial leads that a more government-minded
observer might regard as immaterial (or not even recognize as favorable
to the defense)." Moreover, a civil litigator, who spends the bulk of his
or her time in discovery, might be more familiar with the duty to
disclose evidence than most criminal lawyers, who work where
discovery is limited.72
Perhaps, from this set of conclusions, the judge who will be hardest
on the government is a former civil lawyer who never practiced criminal
law, with the criminal defense lawyer closely behind, and the former
assistant district attorney giving the least scope to Brady. The split
between the majority and the dissent in Connick v. Thompson, 73 where
the majority found no 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability and the dissent
lambasted the entire government team from the district attorney on
down, may reflect a difference in point of view of this kind.74

66.
67.

See id.
See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.

68.

See infta Part V.

69.

See infra Part IV.

70.

See, e.g., Brian Rogers, Famed Prosecutor Defends Actions in Murder Trial, HOUS.

CHRON. (Dec. 23, 2014, 12:02 PM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/
Famed-prosecutor-defends-actions-in-murder-trial-5975822.php
[hereinafter
Rogers, Famed
Prosecutor Defends Actions]; Brian Rogers, Special Prosecutor Sought in Katy Murder Case,

Hous. CHRON. (July 14, 2015), http://www.pressreader.com/usa/houston0chronicle/20150714/
281672548622328/TextView [hereinafter Rogers, Special ProsecutorSought].
71. See, e.g., Rogers, Famed Prosecutor Defends Actions, supra note 70; Rogers, Special
ProsecutorSought, supra note 70.
72. See Gershman, supranote 4, at 725.

73. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71-72, 79-80 (2011).
74. Id
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RULE 3.8(E): BRADY WITHOUT AN EXPLICIT
MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT

The cases are full of precatory statements addressed to "anxious"
prosecutors, to the effect that they should err on the side of disclosure. 75
In the context of a concept as ambiguous as the Brady doctrine, it is
difficult to define the contours of a careful application of the duty. If the
alleged Brady material is relatively unimportant, the allegedly anxious
prosecutor is less likely to recognize it as invoking Brady.76 In some
contexts, however, the meaning of these statements is clear. They might
be translated as: "If you are considering a piece of information and
wondering whether it is sufficiently important to be material, stop
wondering and disclose the information." 7
In the District of Columbia's Rule 3.8(e)," this approach has been
made the foundation of a rule of professional conduct that is differently
worded from Brady.79 The Rule truncates the statement of the duty by
omitting any express requirement of materiality.s A rough statement of
the Rule, taken literally and to its logical extent, is that the duty to
disclose extends to all information that is favorable to the defense, even
if it has the smallest possible importance." The relevant portions of
the Rule, as set out in the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct, are
as follows82 :
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall not . .. [i]ntentionally fail to
disclose to the defense, upon request and at a time when use by the
defense is reasonably feasible, any evidence or information that the
prosecutor knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or to mitigate the offense .8.. 3

Although it does not use the Brady terminology, the simple translation is
that it is Brady without an explicit requirement of materiality.84
The interpretation of the Rule, however, is not so simple. The Rule
is accompanied by a comment that seems to reinsert the materiality

75.
419, 439
76.
77.
78.
79.

E.g., In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 210-11 (D.C. 2015) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
(1995)).
See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439.
See id.; In re Kline, 113 A.3d at 210-11.
D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(e) (D.C. BAR 2007).
Id; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

80.

D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(e).

81.
82.
83.
84.

See id
Id.
Id.
See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(e).
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requirement." The comment provides that the Rule "is not intended
either to restrict or to expand the obligations of prosecutors derived from
the United States Constitution" or from governing statutes or other court
rules.8 6 If this comment is taken literally, the Rule is not intended to
create any duty that does not exist under Brady or comparable local
laws." There is a contradiction between the literal language of the Rule
and the interpretive note that accompanies it."
In the disciplinary case of In re Kline,8 9 the D.C. Court of Appeals
decided in favor of the literal statement of the Rule and against the
interpretation suggested by the comment.90 Kline was a former Assistant
U.S. Attorney who had prosecuted the accused on the basis of
eyewitness testimony.9 1 Although he had notes from an interviewing
officer to the effect that one of the eyewitnesses, the victim, had said he
"did not know who shot him," Kline answered a Brady request by
stating that the government was not "in possession of any truly
exculpatory information."9 2 Kline disclosed other Brady material, but
not this item.93 The case was tried to a hung jury.94 Later, another
Assistant U.S. Attorney disclosed the victim's statement to the defense,
but the new evidence turned out to be of little importance, because this
time the jury convicted the defendant while knowing of the questioned
statement.9 5 The Board on Professional Responsibility ultimately found
a violation of Rule 3.8(e) and recommended that Kline be subjected to a
thirty-day suspension.96
The court of appeals upheld the finding of a violation but concluded
that sanctioning Kline would be unwarranted.9 7 There was other
evidence that supported the defendant's guilt, and the same notes that
included the victim's non-identification explained the discrepancy in
terms of the victim not wanting to cooperate, due to having been arrested
for possession of a machine gun as well as being in pain.98 The court
85.

See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(e) cmt. 1.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
See id.
See id. r. 3.8(e) & cmt. 1.
113 A.3d 202 (D.C. 2015).
Id. at 206-13.
Id. at 204-05.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 205-06.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 205.
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considered Kline's argument that the information was not material, as
the comment implicitly requires it to be, but disagreed with that
interpretation of the Rule."
The court reasoned that the text of the Rule was superior in
interpretation to the comment and also that the constitutional basis
of Brady was not designed, as disciplinary rules are, to guide
behavior." Its reasoning led the court to uphold the Board on
Professional Responsibility's conclusion that Kline had "intentionally
withheld the statement because he did not think it was exculpatory."o
Nevertheless, Kline's understanding that materiality was required
was "wrong but . .. not unreasonable," and he was "not found to

have been dishonest."' 02 Therefore, "sanctioning Kline would [have]
be[en] unwarranted."l0 3
Other jurisdictions with similar rules are divided on the materiality
question. The Supreme Court of Louisiana'" and North Dakota"os agree
with the D.C. Court of Appeals in interpreting similar disciplinary rules
as dispensing with any requirement of materiality.' 06 On the other hand,
the Supreme Court of Colorado,' 07 Ohio,'0o and Wisconsin' 09 have
reasoned that multiple standards would create confusion," 0 a conclusion
that seems supported by the ambiguity in the Brady doctrine itself."
This Article reaches the same conclusion but on the different ground that
application of a disciplinary rule that does not include some sort of
requirement that the "favorable" information be minimally important, or,
in other words, material, is unworkable." 2

99. Id. at 209-10.
100. Id. The court also advanced other reasons for its holding, including (1) that Brady
questions depend on the entire record and can be judged definitively only after trial, whereas the
Rule also operated before trial; (2) that a rule erring in favor of disclosure would benefit defendants;
(3) that state courts construing similar rules in this manner were more persuasive; and (4) other
arguments. Id. at 210-13.
101. Id. at 214.
102. Id. at 215-16.
103. Id. at 204.
104. In re Jordan, 913 So. 2d 775, 781-82 (La. 2005).
105. In re Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672, 678 (N.D. 2012).
106. 913 So. 2d at 781-82; 820 N.w.2d at 678.
107. In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1170-71 (Colo. 2002).
108. Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ohio 2010).
109. In re Riek, 834 N.W.2d 384, 390-91 (Wis. 2013).
110. 47 P.3d at 1170-71; 923 N.E.2d at 130; 834 N.W.2d at 390-91.
111. See Giannelli, supra note 5, at 599-600.
112. See infra PartV.
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THE BORDERLAND OF THE BRADY DOCTRINE

State v. Temple13 is a case in the author's jurisdiction that
illustrates controversies that fall into what might be called the
borderland of Brady-and perhaps the borderland of Rule 3.8(e) as
well.114 The Temple case has been repeatedly described in newspapers,
although its appellate ending has not yet played out."' The assistant
district attorney who tried the case turned over Brady material but
explained that she had not disclosed every "rabbit trail" or "kooky
lead.""' These terms show the difficulty of the Brady doctrine-not of
its fundamental concept, but of its application."' What an assistant
district attorney may honestly see as a rabbit trail or kooky lead may
look to a defense attorney like Brady material."' It is no answer to say
that the careful prosecutor would turn it over, because the prosecutor
may have difficulty even seeing it as potential Brady information, and it
may be seen differently in the twenty-twenty vision of hindsight.
A.

Rabbit Trails, Dead Ends, and Kooky Leads

These are not technical terms, but perhaps in the Brady universe
they ought to be. To establish a concrete meaning for them, let us say
that a rabbit trail is a lead that actually leads nowhere discernible, just as
a rabbit trail in a grassland may do. The proverbial hearsay clue
overheard 1 9 in a crowded bar is the archetype. 120 A more realistic
example is the anonymous suggestion that "someone thought" that a
"homeless individual" who sometimes might be found near the
intersection of Seventy-Fourth Street and Seventh Avenue might have
been "the real killer." An effort to follow this dubious lead will disclose

113. See Rogers, Special ProsecutorSought, supranote 70.
114. See id.
115. Id.; see Rogers, Famed ProsecutorDefends Actions, supra note 70. These reports show
vigorous disagreement between defense attorneys and prosecutors regarding the scope of the Brady
doctrine. See Rogers, Famed Prosecutor Defends Actions, supra note 70; Rogers, Special
ProsecutorSought, supranote 70.
116. See Brian Rogers, Prosecutor Defends Her Actions in Temple Case, Hous. CHRON.
(Dec. 22, 2014, 8:54 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/
Prosecutor-defends-her-actions-in-Temple-case-5974462.php.
117. See Giannelli, supranote 5, at 599-600.
118. See Rogers, Special ProsecutorSought, supra note 70 (reporting defense attorney's highly
critical remarks about information withheld by the prosecution).
119. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (referring to an "off-hand,
overheard remark").
120. See id.
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little, because the location is within Central Park,12 1 for one thing, and
the individual is no one in particular, for another. The rabbit trail
narrows quickly to nothing. A dead end, according to a similar
definitional effort, is entirely different: the alleged culprit is identifiable,
but a little investigation shows that he is not and could not have been the
real killer. The man so accused is an air traffic controller, perhaps, and
unimpeachable evidence at his highly technological place of
employment shows that he did not commit the crime because he was on
the job.122
A kooky lead, as the term might have been used, is one that on its
face is absurd. Justice Souter referred to the possibility of pleadings that
blame "little green men" or that tell the story of a trip to another
planet.123 One might hypothesize a case in which a witness suggests that
voodoo killed the victim or that the perpetrator is hiding in a fourth or
sixth dimension.
Could these kinds of leads appear in serious criminal cases? At first
blush, they all seem like silly examples: the kind of information that
does not sound material, in the nomenclature of the Brady doctrine, and
that does not even appear favorable to the defense, if one applies the
standard of Rule 3.8(e).124 The rabbit trail involving the homeless man
likely does not provide a basis for claiming that evidence exists, because
it is multiple-level hearsay, and some Brady cases indicate that
inadmissible evidence is not Brady information.125 The dead end
involving the ironclad alibi cannot really help the accused because it
carries its own refutation, and to parade this kind of theory before the
jury diminishes the credibility of the defense. Some cases have held that
a witness's failure to identify the defendant in a photographic spread is
not Brady material,126 presumably because it was a dead end under the

121. See Search Results for "Central Park, NY," MAPQUEST, https://www.mapquest.com
(follow "Find Places" hyperlink; then search "Central Park, N.Y.").
122. An event closely similar to this example occurred during a capital murder trial. See DAVID
CRUMP & GEORGE JACOBS, A CAPITAL CASE IN AMERICA: How TODAY'S JUSTICE SYSTEM
HANDLES DEATH PENALTY CASES FROM CRIME SCENE TO ULTIMATE EXECUTION OF SENTENCE

120-21 (2000).
123. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
124. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(e) (D.C. BAR 2007); Valdez, supra note 4, at
260-61.
125. E.g., United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1991); mIess v. State, 606
S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc); see also Valdez, supra note 4, at 269.
126. Johnson v. United States, 544 A.2d 270, 275 (D.C. 1988). Contra United States v.
Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007).
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circumstances. 127 A defense asserting that voodoo was the weapon of the
128
alleged real killer does not seem likely to claim the jury's credence.
But this analysis ignores the yawning ambiguity of the Brady
doctrine. A series of little twists in these pieces of information could
make them into real leads that one might consider the stuff of a
disclosure duty. For example, a bit of further information coming from
an eyewitness who can describe a shabbily dressed individual who ran
from the scene begins to make the rabbit trail into something more
concrete. 12 Imagine that this information is at first unknown to all, but
is discovered by the defense after conviction. A defense lawyer might
well argue that he would have called the witness and challenged
the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
fleeing suspect was not the perpetrator. Now, the controversy becomes a
debate about whether a reasonable prosecutor would have sufficiently
set aside his own view of the case (a frequent prerequisite for
recognizing Brady information)' 30 to have foreseen this fleeing subject's
evidence as a consequence of the earlier misinformed, unknown, and
doubtful eyewitness.
As for the identified individual with the solid alibi, the defendant
might call such a person and suggest that he could have left the job site
for a period of time and committed the crime, then slinked back into the
airport control tower.131 Again, the prosecutor would recognize this
avenue of defense only by setting aside his view of the case and
considering a dubious line of defense. The defense lawyer who uses this
evidence on this theory risks tarnishing every other defensive theory,
including the argument that eyewitnesses are subject to reasonable
doubt, and this consideration reduces the significance of the theory
further. But like the fleeing homeless subject, this possibility depends on
all of the evidence, and it probably depends even more on the prejudices
of the beholder.
The voodoo example is harder to fit within a reasonable example of
Brady information, but perhaps even this odd claim could qualify in
peculiar circumstances. One need only imagine that there is an
127. For example, the photograph may be a poor likeness, or it may be obscured by (or in the
absence of) major facial hair different from the defendant's appearance at the time of trial and
crime, or other facts may cause the event. Most cases, however, hold that non-identifications are

Brady material. See Jernigan,492 F.3d at 1056.
128.

Butseeinfranote 132.

129. For the discussion of a homeless individual often found at a certain intersection, see supra
Part W.A.
130.

See Rogers, SpecialProsecutorSought, supra note 70.

131.

See CRUMP & JACOBS, supranote 122, at 121 (hypothesizing a similar but different case).
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alternative subject whom the defense might accuse, and we might
suppose that the alternate was so filled with animosity that he attacked a
voodoo doll made to resemble the victim. 13 2 There might be advocates
who would claim that this additional piece of information is favorable to
the defendant because it helps to demonstrate motive on the part of
someone else. Whether a reasonable prosecutor would put these facts
together depends, again, on everything else in the case-and on who is
judging the prosecutor.
In State v. Temple, it is possible the prosecutor can credibly assert
an absence of any known Brady violation in the fact that she did not turn
over information about some kinds of "rabbit trail[s]" or "kooky
lead[s]."' 33 This claim may be believable, especially in the context of a
case in which the defense advances a large number of theories without
disclosing any of them prior to trial-as is the usual defensive approach.
The difficulty is that an advocate with a different point of view, one
engendered by a career spent in criminal defense, is likely to disagree,
and will perceive a Brady violation in these examples. The Brady
doctrine produces clearer cases than these, and of course, in those cases
the duty to disclose is clearer.134 But it also produces many dilemmas
like those discussed.1 3 5
B. Diffusion: Does the Mud Stick to the Wall?
In the same homicide case, Temple, the prosecutor asserted that the
Brady doctrine, if it is strictly and broadly applied, creates an
unworkable burden when the defense asserts many different and
contradictory theories1 36: "When the defense is to just throw mud at the
wall and see what sticks, . . . Brady is an impossible burden."l37 And this
kind of defense is common, especially with skillful defense attorneys.
Defense lawyer Richard "Racehorse" Haynes says "this is my defense,"
132. A variation on this theme appeared in a murder prosecution in West Palm Beach,
Florida, where the defendant was accused of committing the killing because he thought the
victim had "put voodoo" on him. See Daphne Duret, Jury Convicts Man of Second Degree
Murder, Attempt in "Voodoo" Case, PALMBEACHPOST.COM (Feb. 20, 2015, 6:13 PM), http://
www.palmbeachpost.com/news/jury-convicts-man-second-degree-murder-attempt-voodoo-case/

Sz9wyl9rrlysQ3FwbiltRO. The evidence was certainly "material," because it supplied the
prosecution with a motive. The jury reduced the crime to second-degree murder, suggesting that the

voodoo information may indeed have been Brady material. See id.
133. See Rogers, supra note 116.
134. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 152-55 (1972).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 100-02, 112-14 (1976).
136. See Rogers, supranote 116.
137. Id
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if he is sued for having allowed his dog to bite a victim, and mentions
four different and inconsistent possibilities."' They might be summed as
saying, first, that "[m]y dog doesn't bite"; second, that the dog was "tied
up that night"; third, "I don't believe you really got bit"; and finally, "I
don't have a dog."1 39
This kind of see-whether-it-sticks approach can work, at least in the
hands of a skillful defense lawyer who knows how to make it work,
because the government has the highest burden of proof known to the
law: proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense lawyer who succeeds
in this approach is adept at persuading the jury that the prosecutor's
burden is extraordinarily high and that it requires acquittal if there is the
smallest doubt. The successful lawyer is also good at presenting
inconsistent defenses without appearing to dissemble, by advancing each
of them as a possibility that the prosecution must conclusively negate.
This diffusion of defenses often can appear for the first time during
the latter half of a trial. The defendant has the obligation to give notice
of alibi or of insanityl 40 in some jurisdictions, but there is no such
general duty to disclose defensive theories,' 41 and if there were, the
privilege against self-incrimination might be construed as destroying it.
The government then is required to provide Brady material on each of
the separate defensive theories in the middle of the trial and is subject to
42
claims that it has violated Brady by not having foreseen these theories.1
The Brady doctrine presumably applies from a perspective that takes
into account what the prosecution knows or should learn, but inevitably,
it can only be judged by hindsight. 143
C.

Long-Chain CircumstantialEvidence

In the same homicide case, Temple, one of the later-claimed pieces
of Brady information was to the effect that a teenage neighbor was one
of the people whom the victim's dog knew and at whom the dog did not
bark." The Brady argument was that this teenager was a likely
perpetrator of the homicide in question, and his acquaintance with the
138. Gary Cartwright, How Cullen Davis Beat the Rap, TEX. MONTHLY (May 1979),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/how-cullen-davis-beat-the-rap-2.

139. Id. (emphasis in original).
140. E.g., FED. R. CIM. P. 12.1-.2 (requiring provision of notice of alibi and insanity,
respectively).
141. Contraid.
142. See Valdez, supra note 4, at 263.

143.

See Green, supra note 4, at 646-47.

144. See Rogers, Special Prosecutor Sought, supra note 70; see also Rogers, Famed
ProsecutorDefends Actions, supra note 70; Rogers, supra note 116.
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dog would have made it more likely that he could have committed the
crime. 14 5 There is a Sherlock Holmes story in which one of the clues was
provided by a dog that did not bark, 146 and the great detective was able
to solve the case from this absence of evidence.1 47 The story is an
entertaining one, partly because the clue eluded everyone else, but that
was what made Sherlock Holmes who he was. 14 8
This problem might be called the issue of long-chain circumstantial
evidence. It should not require the fictional perspicacity of Sherlock
Holmes for a government lawyer to perceive the significance of a piece
of Brady material, but failure to disclose the dog's familiarity with the
teenager was claimed as one of the grounds for a new trial.149 It should
be added that the defense, true to the diffusion approach, also included
accusations against other people as the real killer(s),5 o so that the burden
of identifying every piece of long-chain circumstantial evidence must
have been high. But again, it was viewed in hindsight.
There is one commentator who has flatly stated that the
prosecutor's duty under Brady includes reviewing personnel files for all
relevant law enforcement individuals."' Assuming such a "review" is
plausible, the prospect of admissible evidence developing from it in
most cases will be small. Rules 404 and 405 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence exclude almost all of the information that would likely
result. 5 2 But the admissibility concern is less obvious than the fact that
in some jurisdictions, an assistant district attorney who routinely
requested personnel files from the local police department would be
greeted by a surprised reaction. A court in such a jurisdiction reviewing
a subpoena by an assistant district attorney for this purpose would likely
be surprised too. In some jurisdictions, on the other hand, this duty does
exist under Brady.'53 But the information being sought is very long145.
146.

See Rogers, Special ProsecutorSought, supra note 70.
SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Adventure I-Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK

HOLMES 41, 48 (The Floating Press 2009) (1892).
147. Id. at 48-52.
148. Id. at 16-17, 41, 48.
149.

Rogers, Special ProsecutorSought, supra note 70.

150.
151.

See Rogers, supranote 116.
Gershman, supranote 4, at 699-700.

152.

See FED. R. EvID. 404-405 (stating that, generally, attempting to prove character based on

previous actions is inadmissible).
153.

See Jonathan Abel, Brady's Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police PersonnelFiles

and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 745, 773-75, 779 (2015)
(noting, however, that "even well-meaning prosecutors" are often unable to discover or disclose law
enforcement personnel files, and this, according to the author, is Brady's "blind spot"). But some

jurisdictions allow disclosure. Id at 773-75. Abel also provides some of the reasons for
nondisclosure. Id at 783-89.
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chain circumstantial evidence, which is one reason that Rules 404 and
405 almost always exclude it.154 This commentator's suggestion shows
how strangely far apart different viewers are in considering the
borderland of the Brady doctrine.
D. An UnconvincingExcuse: The Information Is Not Credible
It should be added that there is one occasionally asserted
consideration that does not avoid the Brady doctrine: that the
government's lawyer did not consider the information to be true. If the
information is favorable to the defense and material, it must be
disclosed, even if it does not seem credible."' This issue arose in In re
Kline, 156 and the trial judge immediately responded as follows:
Because you are sure [sic] you have the guy, no one could conjure up a
Brady argument? . . . That is why Brady doesn't leave it up to the

prosecutor, for that very reason. You are always sure you have got the
right guy or you wouldn't be prosecuting. 157
This conclusion by the judge necessarily follows such an argument,
because otherwise the government's belief in its evidence would
swallow the Brady doctrine.15 1
On the other hand, allegedly favorable information that is so distant
from direct evidence that its significance is difficult to recognize should
not be the subject of a Brady duty. Genuine rabbit trails and the like may
fit this description. If the information is alleged to be favorable but the
prosecutor does not credit it because no reasonable juror would be likely
to believe it either, the information may not be important enough to
trigger a constitutional duty. This is the function of the materiality
requirement in the Brady doctrine, and it is needed even more in a
disciplinary rule that invokes sanctions, including disbarment. 9

154. See FED. R. EVID. 404-405. And therefore the information may not be Brady material to
begin with. See Valdez, supranote 4, at 268-69.
155. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
156. 113 A.3d 202, 205 (D.C. 2015).
157. Id. (alteration in original).
158.

See id. The information also proved not to be credible to a later jury, which heard the

evidence but still convicted the defendant. Id. at 205-06.
159. See In re Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672, 677-78 (N.D. 2012).
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Why Does Any of This Matter?

In one recent celebrated case,160 law enforcement officers received

(or were flooded with) more than 500 tips that "[p]ull[ed] [i]n [a]ll
[d]irections."' 6 ' Many of these 500 items presumably included multiple
pieces of information ranging from the tip itself to its source and quality,
and investigation of each tip would have created countless more.1 62 in
the Temple case, paper in the district attorney's possession filled twenty
file boxes,1 63 and, again, this paper was the tip of the iceberg because
more information undoubtedly existed in electronic files, field notes,
oral statements, and similar sources.
In Smith v. Cain," the critical item was a few sentences-mostly
in handwriting among field notes-that a defense attorney could have
used to impeach an important government witness. 16 5 The government's
files in this quintuple murder case probably were enormous. 16 6 Justice
Thomas's opinion shows how readily the alleged discrepancy could be
viewed as irrelevant.' 6 ' Every law student has had the experience of
reading an appellate opinion and missing a crucial paragraph. In
prosecuting the Smith case, it would have been easy for an Assistant
U.S. Attorney to read right over the information at issue. It assumes
much greater significance when viewed in isolation, especially in a
Supreme Court opinion.
None of this discussion negates the government's duty under Brady
to find and disclose favorable evidence.1 68 The doctrine is unforgiving,
in a sense, because the government lawyer's good faith does not avoid
it.1 69 But these considerations show the need for some kind of
requirement that the information have a minimal degree of importance.
Otherwise, the sideshow created by rabbit trails and similar information
will take over the circus: the main objective, which is the Brady
160.

See Joseph Rhee et al., N.Y Prison Break: The Final Hours Before Escapees Richard

Matt and David Sweat Were Captured, ABC NEWS (July 23, 2015, 2:03 PM), http://abcnews.go.
com/US/ny-prison-break-final-hours-escapees-richard-matt/story?id=32639393.
161. See Simon McCormack, Tips Pull Cops in All Directions for Escaped New York
Murderers, HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/
10/escaped-new-york-murderers_n_7556742.html.
162. See id.
163. Rogers, supra note 116.
164. 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012).
165. Id. at 629-31.
166. This conclusion follows from comparison to the Temple case, which concerned one
homicide rather than five. See supranote 163 and accompanying text.

167. See Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 631-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 630 (majority opinion).
169. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).
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doctrine. And even more so, a minimum level of importance ought to be
required in a rule that disciplines lawyers.
In addition, many people would be surprised by the variations in
investigation and resources among different jurisdictions. The imaginary
picture seen by many people may depict assistant district attorneys as
having leisure to prepare their cases. The picture may be accurate in
some places, but it is not in others. When the author of this Article was
trying criminal cases, the police reports in serious cases might consist of
a few pages-usually fewer than five. A robbery or rape case would
have an on-scene report of perhaps two pages, and there would be a
lineup report of another two pages. Typically, there was no further
investigation of these kinds of cases. The assistant district attorney who
tried a given case might have had little acquaintance with the reports
other than in connection with plea negotiations. The assistant district
attorney would meet for the first time with witnesses who appeared
immediately before trial. This system worked because screening of
cases, before they were filed, limited them to those with strong evidence.
In some federal jurisdictions, available resources may be copious by
comparison, and in fact they may be in some states. In some rural
regions, contrary to the image of the bustling urban district attorney's
office, there is one district attorney, who handles everything from smallamount drug cases to aggravated murders. These considerations do not
affect the elements of the Brady doctrine, but they do affect an assistant
district attorney's ability to recognize obscure Brady material as well as
the extent of the government's knowledge.
V.

TI-E NEED FOR A MATERIALITY ELEMENT:
INTERPRETING RULE 3.8(E)

None of these examples displaces the undeniable existence of
serious Brady material that ought to be disclosed. The description of
these borderland possibilities, from rabbit trails to long chains, does not
disturb the doctrine that important favorable information must be
provided to the defense.170 But the point is that some element of
importance ought to be a part of this doctrine. The assertion that a crime
might have been committed by a homeless man near the intersection of
Seventy-fourth Street and Seventh Avenue"' may be a useless rabbit
trail, but if one ignores materiality and all other synonyms for
importance, it is "favorable" to the defense. The fact that it is a rabbit
170.
171.

See, e.g., Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 630.
See supraPart W.A.
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trail does not prevent it from being favorable. It just is not useful. But
the concept that differentiates the rabbit trail from Brady information is
precisely an element of usefulness, or significance, or importance. It is
the element that is found in the doctrine in the form of the requirement
of materiality: a degree of usefulness, or significance, or importance that
creates the "reasonable probability" of a different result. 17 2 It is the
element that is expressed by the concept that undisclosed Brady material
"undermine[s] confidence" in the verdict."'
The interpretation of Rule 3.8(e) by the D.C. Court of Appeals
dispenses with materiality.174 But it seems a stretch to say that a true
rabbit trail, the kind that rapidly leads nowhere, is "favorable" to the
defense. The requirement that the information be favorable is, after all,
still an element of Rule 3.8(e).' Perhaps the requirement that the
information be minimally promising is inherent in the idea of favorable
information, because information that has so little significance that it
cannot be useful is not favorable. Thus, the possibility exists that even
though Rule 3.8(e) has dispensed with an explicit requirement of
materiality, some notion of materiality must be retained within the idea
that Brady information, like Rule 3.8(e) material, is information that
is favorable.
The trouble with this conclusion, if one reaches it, and if one
applies the D.C. Court of Appeals's reasoning to it, is that the degree of
materiality or importance that is necessary for information to be
characterized as "favorable" is undefined. One cannot tell where the line
is drawn, and its identification will wander up and down, depending on
the reader. And in a rule of discipline, that sort of ambiguity is
undesirable. If there is to be a disciplinary rule like Rule 3.8(e), as for
serious Brady violations there should be, let it not be without a defined
element that can make all the difference.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Brady doctrine is solidly expressed by the Supreme Court. The
difficulty is in its application. Different lawyers, different jurisdictions,
and different courts reach differing conclusions about its meaning. It
would be helpful if the Supreme Court were to describe more
specifically the concept of materiality: how important the piece of

172.
173.
174.
175.

See 132 S. Ct. at 630 (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 (2009)).
See id. (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).
See In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 206-13 (D.C. 2015).
See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(e) (D.C. BAR 2007).
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information must be to trigger the Brady doctrine. But however helpful,
this specification would be difficult to create.
And then, there is the separate issue of attorney discipline, which
this Article has set out to analyze."' One might think that a rule, like
3.8(e),177 that can lead to disbarment of an attorney would be relatively
clear. Further, there should be such a rule, because otherwise there
frequently would be no disadvantage to an attorney who violated Brady
except the attorney's own concept of wrongfulness and the unlikely
prospect of later discovery of the violation and a resulting reversal. But a
rule of discipline should be applied so that attorneys can readily
recognize when they are violating it.
The D.C. Court of Appeals's interpretation of Rule 3.8(e)"' does
not meet this standard. By dispensing with any element of materiality in
the Rule, the D.C. Court of Appeals has made the disciplinary process
ambiguous and unfair.17 9 Removing the materiality requirement means
that a govermment attorney must disclose even information that is not
important to the outcome of the case.' The duty applies to everything
that the government knows, including police officers, agents, and
government employees; the attorney has a duty to learn about all of this
information.'"' If the duty extended to information that was important,
the duty would be less ambiguous, because an attorney can be expected
to recognize Brady information-that is, information that is favorable
and material. Extending the duty to immaterial information leaves the
government attorney with unsatisfactory guidance in recognizing even
what is favorable. In addition, the courts have left decision-makers with
an amorphous standard in deciding whom to sanction. They have blurred
the concept of "favorable" information because the information can be
so unimportant that its favorable nature is not apparent.
Rule 3.8(e) contains a requirement that the government attorney
act "intentionally" in failing to disclose the allegedly favorable
information.' 8 2 One might think that this element of the Rule could make
the process fairer because a failure to disclose something unimportant
enough that the attorney does not see it as favorable might mean that the
attorney has acted unintentionally. The D.C. Court of Appeals, however,

176.

See supra notes 17, 159 and accompanying text and Part V.

177.

D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(e).

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See In re Kline, 113 A.3d at 211-13.
See id. at 213.
See id. at 212-13.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(e).
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has read this possibility out of the Rule."' The court applied the element
of intent only to the act of nondisclosure, not to the knowledge that the
information is favorable. 18 4 The court concluded that the attorney in the
case before it, Kline, had acted intentionally, even though he did not
understand the information to be favorable."' The court's opinion stated
that Kline had "intentionally withheld the statement because he did not
think it was exculpatory."1 86
The D.C. Court of Appeals opinion is well-written and uses
traditional means of statutory interpretation.18 7 But there are other courts
that have reached contrary results-again, by using traditional means of
statutory interpretation. 18 The trouble is, to avoid investigating and
sanctioning attorneys for nondisclosure of allegedly favorable
information that is too unimportant to be thought exculpatory, the D.C.
Court of Appeals will need to impose some sort of requirement of
importance, or materiality. The D.C. Court of Appeals can do so by
defining favorable information as that which could make a difference. It
would be better, however, if the Rule were amended to provide a
standard of importance or materiality.

183. See In re Kline, 113 A.3d at 213-14.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 214.
186. Id.
187. See id at 206-13.
188. See In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1170-71 (Colo. 2002); Disciplinary Counsel v.
Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125, 130-31 (Ohio 2010); In re Riek, 834 N.W.2d 384, 390-91 (Wis.
2013).
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